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Introduction
Imagine you are at a wedding and the bride proposes a 
toast. You observe as she reaches over a coffee cup to pick 
up her glass. You then prepare to reach for your own glass. 
There is no cup obstructing your path to it. If human imi-
tation is rational, your reach trajectory should not be per-
turbed by the recent observation of the bride’s obstacle 
avoidance (Gergely and Csibra 2003). Why move with a 
higher trajectory when there is no need to? Yet, increasing 
evidence suggests that when moving within a social con-
text, humans often perform actions which, at least super-
ficially, appear suboptimal to the goal they are trying to 
achieve.
The ability to identify these seemingly irrational actions 
may be present early in development (Gergely and Csi-
bra 2003) and the observation of irrational, compared to 
rational, actions results in distinct patterns of neural activ-
ity (Brass et al. 2007; Marsh et al. 2014). Despite this com-
petency in identifying irrational actions, humans display 
a curious tendency to both implicitly and explicitly copy 
them (McGuigan et al. 2011; Marsh et al. 2013; Griffiths 
and Tipper 2009; Hardwick and Edwards 2011).
The current study recorded participants’ movements 
during an established imitation task and manipulated the 
rationality of the observed action in two ways (Wild et al. 
2012; Forbes et al. 2016). Firstly, we aimed to establish 
whether participants’ own movements would be sensitive to 
height of a model’s trajectory even when this was exagger-
atedly high and rated as irrational. Secondly, we aimed to 
establish whether participants code the environment of the 
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model into their own motor programs, even when this com-
promises the efficiency of their own movements.
Motor contagion: observed actions influence the 
observer’s own actions
Action perception and action production are closely related 
(James 1890; Prinz 1997). This link has been robustly 
demonstrated behaviourally using a range of experimen-
tal approaches (see Krishnan-Barman et al. 2017; Bec-
chio et al. 2010; for reviews). Automatic imitation studies 
have highlighted that the observation of a congruent action 
speeds the execution of a subsequent action (e.g. observe 
hand opening/perform hand opening), whereas the obser-
vation of an incongruent action slows the execution of a 
subsequent action (e.g. observe hand opening/perform hand 
closing) (Brass et al. 2000; see Heyes 2011 for a review). 
Motor interference tasks have shown that the execution of 
a continuous sinusoidal movement (e.g. in the horizontal 
plane) is perturbed by the observation of a similar move-
ment in the orthogonal plane (e.g. in the vertical plane; Kil-
ner et al. 2003). Similarly, imitation studies using motion 
tracking have shown that participants’ movements are sen-
sitive to the kinematics of recently observed movements, 
such as the velocity and height of a model’s movements 
(Wild et al. 2010; Forbes et al. 2016).
These findings in combination with neurophysiologi-
cal (Di Pellegrino et al. 1992) and neuroimaging data 
(Kilner et al. 2009; Oosterhof et al. 2013) suggest that 
our motor systems are readily influenced by the observa-
tion of another agent’s actions: a phenomenon known as 
motor contagion (Blakemore and Frith 2005). Whilst the 
extent of motor contagion appears to be influenced by a 
range of social cues (Wang and Hamilton 2012), such as 
the animacy (Liepelt and Brass 2010), group membership 
(Rauchbauer et al. 2015; van Schaik et al. 2016), and inten-
tion of the observed agent (Liepelt et al. 2008), whether the 
rationality of the observed action influences motor conta-
gion remains relatively unexplored.
Rationality and overimitation
The ability to identify and reason about the rationality 
of a goal-directed action may be present from approxi-
mately 12 months of age (Gergely and Csibra 2003; 
Kamewari et al. 2005; Scott and Baillargeon 2013; 
Sodian et al. 2004). In addition to this early competency 
in distinguishing rational from irrational actions, adult 
neuroimaging studies have revealed that the brain’s men-
talising system, specifically the temporoparietal junction, 
medial prefrontal cortex (Marsh and Hamilton 2011) 
and superior temporal sulcus (Brass et al. 2007), distin-
guishes rational from irrational actions. Medial prefrontal 
cortex may be particularly attuned to unusual or irrational 
actions. Desmet and Brass (2015) showed that the obser-
vation of unusual intentional actions (e.g. an agent delib-
erately closes a box with her arm rather than her hand) 
was related to activation in the anterior medial prefron-
tal cortex, whilst the observation of unusual accidental 
actions (e.g. an agent bumps her arm against a box and 
closes it) was associated with activation in dorsal and 
posterior parts of medial prefrontal cortex (Desmet and 
Brass 2015).
Given our early competency in identifying irrational 
actions and the brain’s sensitivity to these types of actions, 
human’s tendency to overimitate, that is, copy seemingly 
arbitrary and unnecessary features of an action, seems 
somewhat peculiar (McGuigan et al. 2011). During a typi-
cal overimitation task, participants observe a model per-
form a causally irrelevant action, such as tapping on top 
of a box, and subsequently copy this action when given 
the object. This is despite participants rating the action 
as “silly,” so not required to complete the end-goal of the 
action, such as retrieving a toy from the box (Marsh et al. 
2013). Overimitation may be present from approximately 
18 months (Nielsen 2006), shortly after infants show sen-
sitivity to irrational actions (Gergely and Csibra 2003). 
The tendency to overimitate then increases with age dur-
ing childhood and persists into adulthood (McGuigan et al. 
2011; Whiten et al. 2016). Whiten et al. (2009) have tried 
to explain overimitation in terms of a “copy all, refine 
later” strategy. Whilst in some circumstances (e.g. during 
overimitation tasks) this may result in the imitator perform-
ing inefficient actions, in general such a strategy may be 
adaptive as objects and tasks are often “casually opaque” 
(Lyons et al. 2007). For example, it is often not immedi-
ately clear how a novel object functions or what the par-
ticular requirements of a task are.
Overimitation tasks usually involve participants explic-
itly copying an unnecessary action performed on an object. 
However, motor contagion studies have shown that par-
ticipants’ own movements are also sensitive to unneces-
sary and task irrelevant aspects of observed movement 
trajectories (Griffiths and Tipper 2009; Hardwick and 
Edwards 2011; Wild et al. 2010) For example, Hardwick 
and Edwards (2011) asked participants to perform reach-
ing and grasping actions to an object after having observed, 
or whilst observing, an experimenter reaching with a nor-
mal, or an exaggeratedly high, trajectory. Despite being 
instructed to perform normal reaching movements through-
out the experiment, participants’ maximum wrist height 
was approximately 3 mm higher after having observed, or 
whilst observing, the experimenter reach with an exagger-
atedly high trajectory. Hardwick and Edwards concluded 
that even exaggerated movement kinematics have a small 
but significant effect on the observers’ own movements.
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Furthermore, several studies have demonstrated that 
people imitate in strategic games even when this impairs 
performance. For example, Cook et al. (2012) asked people 
to play rock–paper–scissors either with or without a blind-
fold (Cook et al. 2012). When both players wore blind-
folds, the number of draws (i.e. when both participants 
made the same gesture) was at chance. However, when 
only one player was blindfolded, the frequency of draws 
was elevated. This was despite participants being instructed 
to win as much as possible. This tendency to imitate even 
when it compromises people’s performance and financial 
payoffs has further been demonstrated in a variant of the 
whac-a-mole arcade game (Naber et al. 2013) and in play-
ers of matching pennies (Belot et al. 2013).
‘Irrational’ movements: learning and communicating
So what could be behind this tendency to copy and be influ-
enced by irrational movements? Gergely and Csibra (2006) 
argued that during development ostensive pedagogical cues 
are vital in triggering and facilitating imitative learning 
(Gergely and Csibra 2006). Infants adopt a ‘pedagogical 
stance’ whereby they attend to and are influenced by exag-
gerated (and seemingly irrational) movements. Brand et al. 
(2002) showed that caregivers display “motionese”—they 
enhance or exaggerate features within an action sequence 
to facilitate the infant’s processing of that action. For exam-
ple, a slow or curved trajectory towards a target can make 
the goal or intention of an action more salient. Nagai and 
Rohlfing (2007) argued that “motionese” can help infants 
to determine what to imitate. Using a saliency-based atten-
tion model, which was sensitive to the colour, intensity, ori-
entation, flicker, and motion of the visual scene, they found 
that motionese could also be utilised by robots when deter-
mining what to imitate—even in the absence of existing 
knowledge about task-related actions or the action goals.
Whilst exaggerated movement trajectories are important 
for imitation and learning during development, more gener-
ally they are important for “joint action optimization” (Pez-
zulo et al. 2013). Pezzulo et al. proposed that during joint 
actions co-actors move in such a way as to optimise the 
success of the interaction (e.g. moving a sofa) rather than 
their own movements within that interaction (e.g. mov-
ing their half of the sofa). This could mean changing one’s 
own movements—and inferring a cost—to benefit the joint 
action. For example, an exaggerated trajectory requires 
more effort and potentially a more awkward position but if 
it signals to a co-actor which direction one is moving the 
sofa, then this optimises the success of the joint goal. This 
theory was supported by Vesper et al. (2016) who showed 
that when pairs of participants were required to arrive at a 
target at the same time, they exaggerated the curvature of 
their movements to communicate their arrival time.
Given the importance of exaggerated movement trajec-
tories for learning and their role in joint action optimisa-
tion, we aimed to test whether participants’ own move-
ments would continue to be sensitive to exaggerated and 
irrational movement trajectories even when this compro-
mised the efficiency of their own movements. Alternatively, 
a mechanism could exist which evaluates the rationality of 
the observed movement trajectory so that participants’ own 
movements cease to be influenced by them. This could be 
similar to the mechanisms by which other ‘top down’ fac-
tors modulate imitative behaviours, such as the presence of 
goals (Wild et al. 2010) and the range of social cues out-
lined above (Wang and Hamilton 2012). In the brain, this 
‘top-down’ control of imitative behaviours by social cues, 
such as eye contact, has been shown to be modulated by 
medial prefrontal cortex (Wang et al. 2011). Given that 
medial prefrontal cortex responds to action rationality 
(Desmet and Brass 2015; Marsh and Hamilton 2011), it is 
plausible that a similar mechanism may also modulate the 
imitation of irrational movement trajectories.
Coding the environment of others into our own
When we move within a social context, we often encode 
our own environment in terms of other peoples’ points of 
view. For example, Frischen, Loach and Tipper (2009) 
asked participants to reach to a target in the presence of a 
distracter. In such tasks, participants display negative prim-
ing—after having moved to the target, responses to the 
distracter (i.e. the previously ignored stimulus) are slowed 
(Tipper 1985). This is due to participants initially inhibit-
ing responses to the distracter. Frischen et al. (2009) found 
that when participants performed the task by themselves, 
they displayed an egocentric frame of reference—nega-
tive priming was strongest for distracters closest to their 
hand compared to those further from it. In contrast, when 
participants took turns to complete this task with another 
person, participants displayed an allocentric frame of ref-
erence—negative priming was strongest for distracters that 
were salient for the other person rather than themselves. 
They concluded that “observers are essentially processing 
their environment in the same way that the other person is 
encoding it as they are interacting with their surrounding” 
(Frischen et al. 2009; p. 218).
The finding that we may code the environments of oth-
ers in our own action space was supported by Griffiths 
and Tipper (2009) who asked participants to reach for 
and lift up a target block in the presence or absence of 
an obstacle. On trials where there was no obstacle, but 
in the previous trial they had moved over an obstacle, 
participants’ reach trajectory was higher compared to tri-
als where the previous trial contained no obstacle. When 
participants took turns to complete the task with another 
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participant, they found that the obstacle avoidance of one 
participant influenced the reach trajectory of the other 
but only if the observed obstacle was in the peripersonal 
action space of the participant. If the obstacle was out-
side “the comfortable reach space of the observer”, this 
had no effect on reach trajectory. However, this view 
was later challenged by Griffiths and Tipper (2012) who 
found that the observed obstacle avoidance could take 
place outside of the peripersonal space of the participant 
and induce obstacle priming, but this was dependent on 
participants sharing their workspace with their co-actor 
and having a sense of ‘shared ownership’ over it. In their 
‘shared workspace’ condition, there was just one set of 
objects which the experimenter moved between the two 
participants after each trial. In contrast, when the partici-
pants had separate workspaces, so one participant had a 
yellow obstacle and target and the other had a blue set; 
obstacle priming did not occur.
Further constraints on obstacle priming have been out-
lined by Roberts et al. (2016). Participants watched videos 
of an actor perform horizontal or curvilinear sinusoidal 
movements either in the presence or absence of a cylin-
drical object. Participants’ task was to perform continuous 
horizontal arm movements. The object in the video acted 
as either an obstacle, so required the actor in the video to 
move with a particular trajectory to avoid it, or as a dis-
tracter, so was present in the video but was not in the path 
of the actor’s trajectory. As previously shown (Roberts 
et al. 2014), participants’ movement deviation in the ver-
tical plane was greater when observing curvilinear com-
pared to horizontal movements. When observing horizontal 
movements, however, deviation increased in the presence 
of an obstacle. Conversely, movement deviation was not 
modulated by the presence of an obstacle or distractor in 
the curvilinear condition. Roberts et al. (2016) proposed 
that the observed environmental context, such as the pres-
ence of an obstacle, only influences participants’ own 
movements when the observed and executed actions are 
congruent (i.e. both actor and participant were performing 
horizontal movements).
The mechanism behind obstacle priming was recently 
explored by van der Wel and Fu (2015) who aimed to inves-
tigate whether obstacle priming was the result of entrain-
ment or co-representation of the model’s action (van der 
Wel and Fu 2015). Entrainment refers to the unintentional, 
rhythmical synchronisation of two individuals’ actions. 
For example, two people sat observing each other in rock-
ing chairs tend rock together in synchrony (Knoblich and 
Sebanz 2008; Richardson et al. 2005). Whereas, co-repre-
sentation involves symbolically representing the goals and 
intentions of the co-actor (Sebanz et al. 2005). Van der 
Wel and Fu (2015) proposed that the mechanism may vary 
depending on the nature of the action.
They asked participants to move a dowel between two 
locations to the pace of a metronome. The metronome pro-
duced either a continuous sequence (a continuous looping 
of a tone every 850 ms) or a discrete sequence (two tones 
separated by 850 ms with a pause following each set). This 
ensured that participants produced either discrete or contin-
uous movements with the dowel. Participants sat next to a 
confederate who moved his own dowel to a discrete or con-
tinuous sequence between his own two targets, whilst the 
participant was performing the same movement. On some 
trials, the confederate had an obstacle between his targets 
and on other trials there was no obstacle. The key manipu-
lation was whether participants could see the action of the 
confederate. For discrete movements, obstacle priming—
the difference between the participants’ peak height when 
the there was an obstacle between the confederate’s targets 
compared to when there was no obstacle—was the same 
regardless of whether participants could see the actions of 
the confederate or not. For continuous movements, how-
ever, obstacle priming only occurred when participants 
could see the action of the confederate. Van der Wel and 
Fu (2015) argued that obstacle priming during continu-
ous movements is due to entrainment and, thus, dependent 
on visual information; whilst during discrete movements, 
obstacle priming is driven by co-representation of the 
actor’s task.
Current aims
Imitation
The first aim of Experiment 1 was to test the limits of par-
ticipants’ sensitivity to irrational movement trajectories. 
Our previous work and that of others has demonstrated that 
participants’ own movements are sensitive to “high” and 
“low” (Forbes et al. 2016; Griffiths and Tipper 2009; Hard-
wick and Edwards 2011) and “fast” and “slow” observed 
movement trajectories (Wild et al. 2010). However, in these 
studies the manipulation of height and speed was relatively 
subtle. For example, the difference between the high and 
low trajectory in Hardwick and Edwards (2011) was 7 cm, 
and 8 cm in Forbes et al. (2016). Our aim was to estab-
lish whether participants’ movements would continue to 
be sensitive to the height of the model’s movement trajec-
tory even when these were clearly exaggerated and rated as 
irrational. As before the height of the actor’s trajectory was 
manipulated, there was a low and high condition (Forbes 
et al. 2016), but we also included an additional “superhigh” 
condition. The peak height of the model’s trajectory in the 
superhigh condition was 12 cm greater than that in the 
low condition. We aimed to test whether participants’ own 
movements would continue to be sensitive to the trajectory 
in this superhigh condition. Experiment 2 was conducted 
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to obtain rationality ratings of the movement trajectories to 
test whether the superhigh movements were deemed more 
irrational than the high and low movement trajectories.
Obstacle priming
Experiment 1 also aimed to build on the obstacle priming 
literature in several ways. Firstly, in Roberts et al. (2016), 
participants were required to make a pre-specified, continu-
ous, horizontal movement so the congruency between the 
observed and executed movement was determined by the 
experimental condition (i.e. whether they were observing 
horizontal or curvilinear movements). In the current study, 
participants observed videos of an actor pointing to a series 
of three targets out of a four possible targets. The actor in 
the video moved with a low, high or ‘superhigh’ (i.e. exag-
geratedly high) trajectory either in the presence of absence 
of obstacles between her targets. The participants’ task was 
to point to the same targets the actor pointed but there were 
no obstacles between the participants’ targets. So, rather 
than being instructed to make a pre-specified movement, 
participants were given goal-orientated instructions (i.e. 
“point to the same targets she pointed to”) and were free 
to point to these targets with a trajectory of their choosing. 
Here, much like during the toast at the wedding, the goal 
was pre-determined (i.e. pick up the glass/point to the tar-
gets), yet participants could decide for themselves how they 
achieved this goal. Thus, our aim was to establish whether 
participants would be influenced by the observed obstacle 
even when the exact nature of the required movement was 
not explicitly pre-specified.
Our second aim concerned the location of model’s 
obstacle. Griffiths and Tipper (2009, 2012) suggested that 
the observed obstacle needed to be within “the comfort-
able reach space of the observer” (i.e. their peripersonal 
action space) to have an effect on their movements (Grif-
fiths and Tipper 2009), or participants must feel they are 
sharing their workspace with their co-actor (Griffiths and 
Tipper 2012). In our task, participants sat 70 cm from a 
screen which displayed videos of an actor moving over 
obstacles to point to a series of targets. This ensured that 
the obstacles were outside of the participant’s peripersonal 
action space. Moreover, there was a clear divide between 
the workspace of the participant which was on the table 
in front of them and that of the actor whose workspace 
appeared on a screen in front of them. Whereas Griffiths 
and Tipper (2009, 2012) required participants to pick up 
a target block, we aimed to investigate obstacle priming 
within an imitative pointing paradigm (Forbes et al. 2016; 
Wild et al. 2010, 2012). We investigated whether obstacle 
priming would occur even when the obstacle was outside 
of the participants’ peripersonal action space, and, when 
participants did not share a workspace with their co-actor. 
Finally, to ensure that any effects were not simply due to 
the visual saliency of the observed obstacle on the screen in 
front of the participants, we included a condition where the 
actor’s obstacle was half the size.
Experiment 1
Methods
Participants
Participants (N = 27, three male) were obtained from the 
UCL Institute of Cognitive Neuroscience participant data-
base and had a mean (±SD) age of 22.0 (±2.9) years. All 
participants were right-handed, had normal or corrected-
to-normal vision and reported no history of neurological 
disorder. All were financially reimbursed for their time and 
gave written informed consent before participating. All 
procedures were approved by the UCL Research Ethics 
Committee.
Stimuli
Videos consisted of a female actor positioned behind a win-
dow frame, which appeared 48 cm × 40 cm on the projec-
tor screen. There was a horizontal bar across just above the 
centre of the window frame so the screen could be split into 
two (see Fig. 1). The top half of every video was the same 
for all trials and started with the actor looking up and smil-
ing before looking down at her hand. At this point in the 
bottom half of the video, the actor moved from her resting 
position and pointed to three out of a possible four targets 
on the table in front of her in sequence. She then returned 
to the resting pad. Each target was a red circle, which 
appeared 4 cm in diameter, and the centre of the targets 
appeared 10.5 cm away from each other on the projector 
screen. There were eight different movement combinations.
There were six different conditions (see Fig. 1): three 
height conditions (low, high, superhigh) and three cup con-
ditions (high small cup, high cup, superhigh cup). In the 
height conditions, the actor moved above the table with a 
peak height of approximately 2–3 cm between the targets 
for the low condition, 8–9 cm for the high condition and 
14–15 cm for the superhigh condition. The initial move-
ment to the first target and the fourth (final) movement 
back to the resting pad were also manipulated to be either 
low, high or superhigh.
Between the targets in the height conditions, there was 
a flat, white marker (4 cm diameter). There were three cup 
conditions. These used the same videos as for the high and 
superhigh videos except a cup (4 cm × 5.50 cm) was super-
imposed between the targets for the high cup condition and 
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superhigh cup condition. The high small cup condition 
used the high condition videos but the cup superimposed 
between the targets was half the size of the cups used in the 
other cup conditions. Videos were edited using Adobe Pre-
mier Pro CC 2015 (Adobe systems, San Jose, CA, USA) 
and presented using Vizard (WorldViz Inc, Santa Barbara, 
USA).
Procedure
Participants sat approximately 70 cm from the projector 
screen (Fig. 2). An electromagnetic marker (Polhemus LIB-
ERTY system, Colchester, USA) was attached to partici-
pants’ right index finger which enabled finger movements 
to be recorded. On the table in front of the participants, 
there was a piece of 81 cm × 66 cm blue card with four 
6 cm diameter red circles stuck in the middle of it. The cen-
tre of the circles was 15 cm apart from each other and was 
30 cm in front of the participants. These red circles acted 
at the targets. There was also a 6 cm × 4 cm piece of blue 
card stuck 10 cm in front of the participant which acted at 
the ‘resting pad’ where participants were required to place 
their right index finger when not moving. There were no 
cups in front of the participants.
Before the start of the experiment participants completed 
calibration: they placed their right index finger into the mid-
dle of each of the four targets and the resting pad so that 
the coordinates could be recorded. After calibration partici-
pants were given eight practice trials. All the practice videos 
Fig. 1  The six conditions; peak height for each condition is shown in parentheses
Fig. 2  The experimental setup
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contained no cups. Participants were instructed to rest their 
finger on the resting pad in front of them. They were told 
to watch the actor in the video and see which three targets 
she points to, then, when she returns to her resting position, 
they should point to the same targets she pointed to in the 
same order. The spatial correspondence between the targets 
in the video and the targets in front of the participants was 
explained. For example, participants were told that if the 
actor in the video pointed to the target on her far left then 
participants should point to the target on their far right so that 
there was a spatial match between their targets. After prac-
tice, participants completed three identical blocks with 48 tri-
als in each block (6 conditions × 8 different target combina-
tions). Videos were presented in a randomised order.
Results
Excluded data
The movement data were analysed using Matlab R2013b 
(MathsWorks, Natick, USA) and filtered with a Butterworth 
filter to remove high frequencies. For each trial, each of the 
participant’s data was chunked into four movements using 
their calibration file: (1) the movement to the first target from 
the resting pad, (2) the movement to the second target; (3) the 
movement to the third target, and (4) the movement back to 
the resting pad. Three participants were excluded from the 
final analysis as over 10% of their trials could not be chunked 
correctly (error rates: 25.5, 17.7 and 14.6%). The error rates 
for the other participants were all below 10% (mean 1.8%, 
SD 2.2%).
Peak height analysis
Mean peak height of the movements between the targets 
(mean of movements 2 and 3) for each condition for each 
participant was subject to repeated measures ANOVAs. The 
means and standard deviations for each condition are shown 
in Table 1.
Height
A one-way, repeated measures ANOVA was conducted with 
height as a factor for the three no cup conditions (low, high, 
superhigh). Epsilon (ε) = 0.597 as calculated to Green-
house and Geisser (1959) was used to correct the one-way 
ANOVA. This revealed a main effect of height (F1.194, 
27.457 = 12.09, p = 0.001, ηp2 = 0.344; Fig. 3). Post hoc 
paired samples t tests revealed that the peak height of partici-
pants’ movements was significantly higher in the high con-
dition [mean (SD): 4.96 cm (2.10)] compared to low condi-
tion [mean (SD): 3.82 cm (1.42)], (t23 = 3.824, p < 0.001, 
d = 0.781), and significantly higher in the superhigh condi-
tion [mean (SD): 5.40 cm (2.80)] compared to the high condi-
tion (t23 = 2.080, p = 0.049, d = 0.425).
Cup
A 2 × 2 repeated measured ANOVA was conducted 
with height (high/superhigh) and cup (cup/no cup) 
as factors. This revealed a main effect of cup (F1, 
23 = 9.325, p = 0.006, ηp2 = 0.288) with participants dis-
playing a greater peak height in the cup conditions [mean 
(SD): 5.50 cm (2.73)] compared to the no cup conditions 
[5.18 cm (2.42)], and also a main effect of height (F1, 
23 = 13.189, p = 0.001, ηp2 = 0.364) with participants dis-
playing a greater peak height for the superhigh compared 
to high conditions (Fig. 3). There was no significant inter-
action between cup and height (F1, 23 = 2.543, p = 0.124, 
ηp
2
 = 0.100). Finally, there was no significant difference 
between the high cup and high small cup condition as 
Table 1  Mean and SD for each of the six conditions
Peak height (cm) No cup low No cup high No cup superhigh Small cup high Cup high Cup superhigh
Mean 3.82 4.96 5.40 5.14 5.12 5.89
SD 1.42 2.10 2.80 2.30 2.40 3.09
Fig. 3  Mean peak height between the targets
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shown by paired samples t test (t23 = 0.350, p = 0.730, 
d = 0.071).
Experiment 2
Experiment 2 was conducted to obtain rationality ratings of 
the movements in the low, high and superhigh conditions.
Methods
Participants
One hundred participants (30 female, 3 left-handed) with 
a mean age of 27 years (range 18–54) were recruited via 
the Prolific Academic website (http://prolific.ac). The 
study took approximately 5 min to complete and partici-
pants received £0.50 in exchange for their participation. 
Ethical approval was granted by the UCL Research Ethics 
Committee and informed consent was obtained from all 
participants.
Stimuli and procedure
An example video for each of the three height conditions 
(low, high, superhigh) was shown to the participants. The 
same movement combination was used for all three height 
conditions. Participants showed each video three times 
and asked to rate the rationality of the action in the video, 
using a battery of three statements (adapted from Marsh 
et al. 2014). The statements were: (1) ‘This action seems 
unnatural’, (2) ‘The action seems efficient’ and (3) ‘I would 
complete this action differently.’ Participants were asked to 
watch the action and then indicate how much they agreed 
or disagreed with each statement on a 5-point scale. This 
created a total of nine trials. The scores on these statements 
were summed, with the scores on Statement 2 reversed 
scored, to produce an aggregated irrationality rating (with 
a maximum score of 15) for each of the three height 
conditions. The experiment can be seen here: testable.
org/t/81590f313.
Results
Excluded data
If participants response time was less than 5 s for at least 
one of the nine trials, then they responded before the end 
of the action in the video and their data were excluded 
from the analysis (n = 19). Similarly, if participants’ 
response times were greater than 60 s for at least one of 
the nine trials, they were excluded from the analysis as it 
is likely they became distracted during the trial (n = 3). 
One participant showed response times both shorter than 
5 s and greater than 60 s, so the final sample consisted 
of 79 participants (25 female, 2 left-handed) with a mean 
age of 28 years (range 18–54).
Irrationality rating
The aggregated irrationality ratings were subject to a one-
way repeated measures ANOVA with height (low, high, 
superhigh) as a factor. Epsilon (ε) = 0.882 as calculated 
to Greenhouse and Geisser (1959) was used to correct 
the ANOVA. This revealed a main effect of height (F1.76, 
137.55 = 4.389, p = 0.018, ηp2 = 0.053; Fig. 4). Post hoc 
paired samples t tests revealed that the irrationality rat-
ings were significantly greater (t78 = 2.347, p = 0.021, 
d = 0.264) for videos showing the superhigh movements 
[mean (SD): 9.95 (2.06)] compared to those showing high 
movements [mean (SD): 9.34 (1.91)]. There was no signifi-
cant difference between the irrationality ratings for the high 
[mean (SD): 9.34 (1.91)] and low [mean (SD): 9.04 (2.27)] 
movement videos (t78 = 0.970, p = 0.335, d = 0.109).
Discussion
The current study used an established sequential pointing 
task to determine whether the rationality of an observed 
movement trajectory influenced the extent to which partici-
pants’ movements were influenced by it. Firstly, we found 
that participants’ pointing movements between a series 
of targets were sensitive to the height of an actor’s move-
ment trajectory (Experiment 1), even when the observed 
movement trajectory was rated as irrational (Experiment 
2). Secondly, we examined participants’ movements after 
Fig. 4  Mean aggregated irrationality ratings for the movements in 
the three conditions
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having observed an actor move over obstacles to reach her 
targets. Participants moved with an even higher trajectory 
between their own targets after having observed these vid-
eos, compared to videos in which there were no obstacles 
between the actor’s targets. This was despite there being no 
obstacle between the participants’ own targets throughout 
the experiment. This suggests that participants’ movements 
are not only influenced by the observed movement but also 
the environment within which the observed movement took 
place. We discuss the implications of our findings in terms 
of theories of imitation and obstacle priming.
Moving higher and higher
Our findings replicate previous work demonstrating that 
participants’ own movements are sensitive to the height 
of a recently observed movement trajectory (Forbes et al. 
2016; Griffiths and Tipper 2009; Hardwick and Edwards 
2011; Wild et al. 2010). They also extend this work in sev-
eral important ways. In previous studies, the difference 
between the high and low observed movement trajectories 
was relatively subtle (Forbes et al. 2016; Hardwick and 
Edwards 2011). However, in the present study we showed 
that participants’ movements continue to be sensitive to 
movement trajectories which are clearly exaggerated and 
rated as irrational (i.e. the superhigh condition). It is not 
clear from our findings whether participants sensitivity to 
the superhigh condition was a form of motor contagion, 
similar to that caused by any biological motion (Blakemore 
and Frith 2005), or whether this is a type of overimitation 
whereby participants are aware that the exaggerated trajec-
tory is causally irrelevant yet still explicitly copy it (e.g. 
McGuigan et al. 2011). There was considerable variation in 
the performance of our participants in the superhigh con-
dition, so it is possible that both mechanisms were operat-
ing. More generally, our findings support work highlighting 
humans’ sensitivity to exaggerated movements trajectories 
(Brand et al. 2002; Desmet and Brass 2015). It is likely that 
the pedagogical (Gergely and Csibra 2006) and communi-
cative value (Pezzulo et al. 2013) of exaggerated movement 
trajectories could be driving participants’ tendency to be 
influenced by them.
It is important to note that whilst the vast majority of 
participants moved higher in the high compared to low con-
dition, fewer distinguished between the high and superhigh 
condition (although the difference in peak height reached 
statistical significance). Indeed, a minority of participants 
moved with a lower trajectory in the superhigh condition 
compared to the high condition. It remains to be seen what 
factors predict a breakdown of motor contagion (and/or 
overimitation) following the observation of exaggerated 
movement trajectories. For example, is this due to a delib-
erate evaluation of action rationality and/or is this related 
to people’s propensity to overimitate? Forbes et al. (2016) 
showed that whilst the movements of autistic adults’ are 
sensitive to the height of observed actions, this effect is 
reduced compared to neurotypical participants. Moreover, 
overimitation studies suggest that autistic children are less 
likely to copy task irrelevant actions (Marsh et al. 2013). 
Future studies should explore whether autistic traits predict 
a breakdown of motor contagion in the superhigh condition 
and, if so, why.
Hardwick and Edwards (2011) required participants 
to make simple, overlearned reach-to-grasp movements 
towards an object. They proposed that participants’ sensi-
tivity to high movement trajectories during this task is in 
line with the goal-directed theory of imitation (Bekkering 
et al. 2000). This theory states that imitators breakdown 
an observed movement into a hierarchy of goals, whereby 
goals of greater importance (e.g. pick up the cup) are imi-
tated more readily than those deemed of lesser importance 
(e.g. pick up the cup by its handle). When the task is sim-
ple, such as during reach-to-grasp actions, observers have 
the cognitive resources to attend to and copy multiple goals 
within the goal hierarchy, for example, both the outcome 
and the kinematics of the observed movement. Conversely, 
if cognitive resources are limited, for example during early 
childhood or when the task is more demanding, imitators 
prioritise goals further up the goal hierarchy (Bekkering 
et al. 2000). Similarly, if a goal is made particularly salient, 
then participants will imitate this goal more readily than 
goals further down the hierarchy (Wild et al. 2010).
Our task required participants to remember the sequence 
of the three targets the actor pointed and then point to their 
own targets in the same order. Our task was therefore more 
demanding than that of Hardwick and Edwards (2011). 
Despite this increased demand, participants’ own move-
ments were still sensitive to the peak height of the actor’s 
movements. It is possible that the saliency of the movement 
trajectory resulted in participants’ movements being sensi-
tive to it, despite the increased cognitive load. Future stud-
ies should directly manipulate the saliency of the elevated 
trajectory and the task demands, for example, by having 
participants point to more targets, to directly test the goal-
directed theory of imitation within this sequential pointing 
paradigm.
Coding the environment of others into our own
The present findings are in line with previous work dem-
onstrating that participants code the environment of the 
observed model, such as an obstacle in her action space, 
into their own action space (Frischen et al. 2009; Grif-
fiths and Tipper 2009, 2012; Roberts et al. 2016). Again, 
we build on this previous work in several important ways. 
Roberts et al. (2016) required participants to make a 
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pre-specified, continuous, horizontal movement whilst 
observing a model make either a congruent (horizontal) 
or incongruent (curvilinear) movement. The presence of 
an obstacle in the video only influenced participants’ own 
movements when both the model and participant were 
performing the same horizontal movements. Whilst the 
goal of the observed and executed movement was con-
gruent in our study (i.e. “point to the same targets that 
she does”), participants were less constrained in terms 
of the nature of the movement they were required to per-
form. That is, the trajectory of their movements was not 
explicitly pre-specified as it was in Roberts et al. (2016). 
This suggests that even when there is no direct matching 
between the observed and executed movement (i.e. they 
are not completely congruent), the environment of the 
model (i.e. the presence of obstacles) continues to influ-
ence participants’ own movements.
Secondly, Griffiths and Tipper (2009) suggested when 
we view another person avoiding an obstacle to reach for a 
target object, for this obstacle to influence our own reaching 
movement, it must be within our peripersonal action space. 
In their study, when the obstacle was beyond the “comfort-
able reach space” of the participant their reach trajectory 
was not perturbed by the obstacle. In our study, however, 
the obstacles between the actor’s targets were displayed 
on a screen 70 cm in front of the participants. Thus, they 
were outside of the peripersonal space of the participants. 
Despite this, participants’ movements between their own 
targets were higher after having observed the actor reach 
over obstacles to point to her targets, compared to when she 
moved with the same trajectory but there were no obstacles 
between her targets. This supports other work demonstrat-
ing that the proximity of the co-actor’s obstacle does not 
influence obstacle priming (van der Wel and Fu 2015).
Griffiths and Tipper (2012) later proposed that for 
obstacle priming to occur participants must share owner-
ship of the workspace with a co-actor, even if the observed 
workspace is not within the peripersonal space of the par-
ticipant. In our study, there was a clear divide between 
the workspace of the participant (i.e. the table they were 
sat at) and the actor’s workspace which was projected as 
a video onto a screen in front of the participants. Despite 
this separation between the workspaces, obstacle priming 
still occurred.
One possibility, however, is that due to the visual simi-
larity between the workspaces (i.e. workspace in the vid-
eos looked like the workspace on the table in front of par-
ticipants), participants may have felt they were sharing the 
workspace with the actor. Griffiths and Tipper (2012) cre-
ated a sense of ‘separatedness’ between the two workspaces 
by having one participant interact with a blue set of objects 
and the other interact with a yellow set. In the shared work-
space condition, participants interacted with the same 
workspace—after each trial, the workspace was moved 
across the table from one participant to the other by the 
experimenter. When interpreted in the light of our current 
findings, it is possible that the visual similarity between the 
observed workspace and the participant’s own workspace 
in Griffiths and Tipper (2012) may have been sufficient to 
cause obstacle priming, although it remains unclear why 
this was not the case in Griffiths and Tipper (2009; Experi-
ment 2).
It should also be stressed that in Griffiths and Tip-
per (2009, 2012) the observed action was not relevant to 
the participant’s own subsequent action. Participants were 
instructed to passively observe the other person’s action. 
This is in contrast to the present study where participants 
were explicitly instructed to attend to the sequence of tar-
gets the model pointed to and then point to the same tar-
gets on the table in front of them. Thus, the present study 
was more similar to a joint action task (Sebanz et al. 2006), 
whereby the action of participants (i.e. the targets they 
pointed to) was dependent on the recently observed move-
ments of the model. This greater attention to the model’s 
movements (Bek et al. 2016) and greater relevance of her 
movements to the participant’s task may also account for 
some of the differences in obstacle priming between the 
present study and those of Griffiths and Tipper (2009, 
2012).
Van der Wel and Fu (2015) proposed that for discrete 
movements obstacle priming is due to the co-representa-
tion of the actor’s task (Sebanz et al. 2005). Conversely, 
for continuous movements obstacle priming is the result 
of entrainment and thus dependent on receiving concurrent 
visual information from a co-actor (Richardson et al. 2005). 
Our task required the execution of discrete movements 
after the participants had observed the actor move to her 
targets. So when participants pointed to their own targets, 
this was in the absence of concurrent visual information 
about the actor’s movements. Thus, our findings are gener-
ally in line with van der Wel and Fu’s (2015) interpretation 
that when performing discrete movements participants co-
represent the task of the co-actor during obstacle priming. 
However, a co-representation account fails to fully account 
for our findings. According to a co-representation account, 
a smaller obstacle requires less adjustment yet there was no 
significant difference between the cup and small cup con-
dition. Future studies should vary the size of the obstacle 
more systematically to directly test the co-representational 
account.
One possibility is that the continued presence of the 
obstacles on the screen in front of participants during their 
response period caused distractor interference (Tipper 
et al. 1997). However, we suggest that this interpretation is 
unlikely. Firstly, the obstacles were small (5.5 cm × 4 cm) 
and appeared 70 cm from the participants so well outside 
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of their peripersonal action space. Secondly, as highlighted 
above, the saliency of the distractor has been shown to 
impact the extent of distractor interference (Tipper et al. 
1998), yet when the size of the obstacle was halved (small 
cup condition) this did not impact the extent of obstacle 
priming. In addition, whilst automatic imitation of move-
ment trajectories is at least partially due to spatial effects 
(i.e. the observed movements being higher up in space; 
Hardwick and Edwards 2012), the higher movements in 
the cup compared to the no cup conditions speak against 
a purely spatial effect. Here, the movements in the videos 
were same height, yet participants moved higher in the cup 
condition. If the effects were purely spatial, we would not 
expect to see these differences.
Finally, a potential avenue for future research could be 
to explore the effects obstacle avoidance has beyond par-
ticipants’ reach trajectory. For example, Hayes et al. (2008) 
found that when participants observed videos of a model 
moving an object to avoid an obstacle, their affective rat-
ings of the moved object were lower compared to when 
she moved the object without having to avoid an obsta-
cle (Hayes et al. 2008). Hayes et al. (2008) argued that 
observing fluent actions, those in which the model does not 
need to avoid an object, results in more positive affective 
responses. It would be of interest to examine whether these 
affective effects of observing fluent actions also transfer to 
the model performing the action and the subsequent imita-
tion of her actions.
Conclusions
To conclude, we found that participants’ movements 
between a series of targets were sensitive to the height 
of observed movement trajectories, even when these were 
irrational—unnecessarily and exaggeratedly high. Sec-
ondly, the presence of obstacles between the model’s tar-
gets resulted in participants moving with an even higher 
trajectory between their own targets, despite there being 
no obstacles between them. This obstacle priming sug-
gests that participants code the environment of a co-actor 
into their own action space. Our results are consistent 
with previous work demonstrating that obstacle prim-
ing is not dependent on the obstacles being within the 
peripersonal space of the participant (Griffiths and Tipper 
2012). Our results also suggest that obstacle priming dur-
ing the observation and execution of discrete movements 
is likely to depend on participants co-representing the 
task of the model (van der Wel and Fu 2015). The current 
paradigm provides a versatile platform to directly test 
this co-representational account and also explore other 
theories of imitation and obstacle priming.
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